

national and subnational identities can be complementary and mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive. "Even in a climate of growing nationalism," she argues, "'artificial' dynastic states were able to shape the loyalties of their inhabitants for generations to come" (341). One wonders whether an analogous balance among regional, national, and continental identities may be equally viable in twenty-first-century Europe.

MATTHEW LEVINGER, *Lewis & Clark College*

Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1871-1945. 5 vols., vol.1: A – F. Ed. Auswärtiges Amt. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000. Pp. xlviii, 633. Cloth EUR 130.60.

Diplomatic historians will enthusiastically welcome this complement to the documentary series of German foreign policy, *Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914* and *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*. The first of five projected volumes lists all professional employees (*Beamte* and *Angestellte*) in the German foreign service, from foreign ministers down to assistants (*wissenschaftliche Hilfsarbeiter*), including consular officials, interpreters, and economic, cultural, and press officers, but excluding military attachés, colonial officials, honorary consuls, or service staff. The entries include basic biographical and career data, including religious and political affiliations, photos (if available), bibliographical references, and location of personal papers. The spacious and clear layout and printing make this volume a pleasure to use. The publication dates for the next four volumes had not yet been announced by February 2003.

DIETHELM PROWE, *Carleton College*

Marcus Kreuzer. *Institutions and Innovation. Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy: France and Germany, 1870-1939*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 210. Cloth \$52.50.

Marcus Kreuzer's account of the modernization of conservative, liberal, socialist, and fascist parties in Germany and France between 1870 and 1939 is interdisciplinary, drawing on literature from both history and political science. The author begins by critiquing historians' arguments regarding the role Germany's interwar economic crisis played in shaping the SPD's rejection of Keynesianism, the Deutsche Volkspartei's adoption of a deflationary platform, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei's response to agricultural crisis, and the NSDAP's

decision to enter the electoral arena. Kreuzer maintains that in each of these cases, historians' stress on economic factors unique to Germany cannot explain why the established parties in Germany had difficulties competing electorally whereas the formed NSDAP thrived.

Instead, Kreuzer compares these parties to their French counterparts and finds that the socialist, liberal, and conservative parties in France coped much better when faced with similar economic and political challenges. In contrast, French fascist movements failed to make the leap to electoral politics. Kreuzer makes a sound theoretical case that political institutions—specifically electoral systems—account for this variance. Weimar's PR electoral system placed little pressure on German parties to innovate. Party loyalists enjoyed secure careers when placed high on electoral lists. Huge electoral districts further increased candidates' dependence on their parties, this time for campaign resources. Interest groups developed cozy relationships with veteran party leaders who, in turn, supported the interests of entrenched unions, big businesses, and large landholders. Finally, perfect PR allowed parties to appeal to a narrow band of supporters and still win seats. The resulting inflexibility cost the established German parties supporters and provided an opening for fascists. The Third Republic's double-ballot electoral system combined small constituencies with majoritarianism; this institutional configuration created the opposite configuration of career uncertainty, independence of candidates from party leaders and interest groups, and strong incentives for developing broad-based electoral appeals. As a result, French candidates and their parties had much stronger incentives than Germans to develop innovative platforms and campaign techniques. The established parties thrived and fascists were deterred from pursuing an electoral strategy.

Kreuzer's convincing logical argument is backed up with considerable empirical evidence from secondary and primary sources, including party publications and contemporaneous government documents. In the empirical chapters, he persuasively shows how the two electoral systems shaped the fortunes of each party family during the interwar period.

The weakest part of the book is Kreuzer's call for an interdisciplinary approach to studying party development. He argues that institutional variables cannot account for all the variance in political parties' fortunes, and that "history matters" (159). The finding that electoral systems are not the only determinant of a political party's fortunes is not a unique interdisciplinary insight but is consistent with even hard-core political science. Social scientists rarely, if ever, claim that a single variable can account for 100% of the observed variance. There are also inconsistencies between the book's theoretical and empirical sections. In his theoretical chapter, the author claims "throughout this analysis politicians are assumed to be ... seekers of public office and the salary, prestige, and influence it offers" (53). In the previous chapter, however, he showed that prior to the advent of mass politics, there were no parliamentary salaries in Germany,

national and subnational identities can be complementary and mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive. "Even in a climate of growing nationalism," she argues, "'artificial' dynastic states were able to shape the loyalties of their inhabitants for generations to come" (341). One wonders whether an analogous balance among regional, national, and continental identities may be equally viable in twenty-first-century Europe.

MATTHEW LEVINGER, *Lewis & Clark College*

Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1871-1945. 5 vols., vol.1: A-F. Ed. Auswärtiges Amt. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000. Pp. xviii, 633. Cloth EUR 130.60.

Diplomatic historians will enthusiastically welcome this complement to the documentary series of German foreign policy, *Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914* and *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*. The first of five projected volumes lists all professional employees (*Beamte* and *Angestellte*) in the German foreign service, from foreign ministers down to assistants (*wissenschaftliche Hilfsarbeiter*), including consular officials, interpreters, and economic, cultural, and press officers, but excluding military attachés, colonial officials, honorary consuls, or service staff. The entries include basic biographical and career data, including religious and political affiliations, photos (if available), bibliographical references, and location of personal papers. The spacious and clear layout and printing make this volume a pleasure to use. The publication dates for the next four volumes had not yet been announced by February 2003.

DIETHELM PROWE, *Carleton College*

Marcus Kreuzer. *Institutions and Innovation. Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy: France and Germany, 1870-1939*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 210. Cloth \$52.50.

Marcus Kreuzer's account of the modernization of conservative, liberal, socialist, and fascist parties in Germany and France between 1870 and 1939 is interdisciplinary, drawing on literature from both history and political science. The author begins by critiquing historians' arguments regarding the role Germany's interwar economic crisis played in shaping the SPD's rejection of Keynesianism, the Deutsche Volkspartei's adoption of a deflationary platform, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei's response to agricultural crisis, and the NSDAP's