

BOOK REVIEWS

Marcus Kreuzer, *Institutions and Innovation: Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy—France and Germany, 1870-1939*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 232 pp. Cloth, \$52.50.

Bonnie M. Meguid, Harvard University

Recent cases of regime change in Eastern Europe and Latin America have sparked a renewed interest in the connection between political parties and democratic consolidation. Parties have been both hailed as the vanguards of democratic ideals and institutions (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Pridham & Lewis, 1996) and denounced as their primary detractors (Taylor-Robinson, 2001). Marcus Kreuzer correctly reminds us that such analysis is not necessarily limited to democracies of the “Third Wave.” In *Institutions and Innovations*, he revisits the cases of the French Third Republic and the German Weimar Republic, attributing their democratic health and longevity to the actions of political parties. Specifically, Kreuzer argues that national differences in party responsiveness to political and socioeconomic challenges spelled the difference between persistent democracy in France and the rise of fascism in Germany. He thus locates the cause of party innovation in the institutional incentives defining each country’s electoral system. Kreuzer complements this largely institutional analysis with rich, detailed historical narratives of party development and innovation.

Why did German political parties become inward looking, risk averse, and more bureaucratized after 1914, whereas French parties became more voter-oriented and innovative? Driven by this central puzzle, Kreuzer begins by refuting existing explanations of party development. Rather than emerging from distinct national patterns of organizational and behavioral development, the French and German parties, he argues, shared similar backgrounds. Between 1870 and 1914, parties of the same ideological family were equally reluctant to adapt to the electoral conditions ushered in with mass politics; French and German socialists proved the most adaptive, with their liberal counterparts coming in second and the conservative parties a distant third.

Given their common historical precursors and adaptability in the early 20th century, what accounts for the different fates of French and German political parties and democratic regimes in the interwar period? Kreuzer offers a solution to this puzzle: an institutional theory of party responsiveness. Embracing the language of rational choice, he argues that electoral institutions “constrain the recruitment, resource mobilization, and vote getting of politicians” (p. 20). The hurdles politicians face and thus their incentives to adapt depend on the electoral environment. Kreuzer works through the logic of this argument, examining the causes and effects of three system-level political characteristics: career uncertainty, electioneering costs, and strategic voting. Career uncertainty, he argues, captures the relative dependence of politicians on the

party machine, thereby indicating the degree to which parties can control and regularize candidate recruitment (pp. 54-55). Because of a candidate's need for resources, electioneering costs "determine the distorting effect that large party bureaucracies and money have on political representation . . . and influence the leverage that the principal suppliers of resources . . . have over candidates" (p. 61). This concept reveals the relationship between candidates and interest groups (pp. 59-62). The third characteristic, that of strategic voting, brings the critical connection between the electorate and party candidate into Kreuzer's analysis of party behavior (pp. 63-64). Beyond the immediate effects of these mechanisms on candidate relations with the party, interest groups, and voters, Kreuzer suggests that these factors shape the adaptability of parties to changing societal conditions and even regime crises.

When applied briefly to the historic examples of France and Germany after 1914, Kreuzer's trichotomy of institutional effects highlights a sharp contrast in the electoral environments confronting French and German politicians. In 1918, the Weimar Republic abandoned the double ballot system it shared with the French Third Republic to adopt a highly pure form of proportional representation (PR). On the basis of this and other electoral differences, Kreuzer describes a France with high career uncertainty, low electioneering costs, and high levels of strategic voting. Weimar Germany emerges as its complete opposite: a country with low levels of career uncertainty, high electioneering costs, and no incentives for strategic voting. What are the implications of these systemic characteristics for French and German political behavior? Kreuzer concludes that French politicians—and thus, by proxy, political parties—have a greater incentive to take risks and respond independently to a given political and economic environment than German politicians, who are protected by and thus beholden to their party and its allied economic interests.

In Chapters 3 to 6, Kreuzer tests his cross-national predictions of party (mal)adaptation. Restricting his analysis to the period between 1918 and 1933 to 1939, he systematically compares the responses of French and German socialist, liberal, conservative, and fascist parties to a series of interwar economic and political crises. To emphasize the impact of the different electoral systems on similar parties, Kreuzer organizes these chapters along a similar systems design: Each chapter is devoted to the behavior of a pair of ideologically similar French and German parties. However, the parallel structure of these analyses is undermined by the variety of crises examined. Kreuzer discusses how the socialists respond to the rise of Keynesianism and the threat of bureaucratization; how the liberals react to postwar inflation; how the conservatives confront the agricultural crisis; and how the fascists, in contrast to the already entrenched parties, face the problems and challenges of electoral emergence. He never fully explains his choice of crisis in each case, leading the reader to question the applicability of his predictions to the other political and economic predicaments.

To test his propositions, Kreuzer methodically works through the electoral incentives facing each French and German party and determines the costs and benefits of organizational innovation. Consistent with his initial expectations, the incentives tend to fall along national lines: French candidates and thus parties are encouraged to innovate, whereas the German parties, sheltered by their electoral system, are discouraged

from costly but electorally necessary adaptation. This general prediction, however, does not apply to the French and German fascist parties. On the contrary, Kreuzer goes to great lengths to show how the electoral conditions of the Third Republic disadvantage the new parties for the very reasons that they facilitate the electoral entrenchment of the mainstream parties. Likewise, by encouraging the inflexibility and thus the electoral demise of established parties, the institutions of the Weimar Republic promote the electoral advancement of the fascist parties.

In the concluding chapter, Kreuzer turns to the limitations of his institutional arguments and reintroduces the contingencies of history. He eschews the cross-national pairwise comparisons employed in the previous four chapters for a national, cross-party approach. This arrangement, Kreuzer claims, allows him to explore the effects of contextual factors on the electoral trajectories of different parties within each country. Although this line of inquiry is consistent with his original aim to combine the methodological approaches of history and political science, in practice, it serves only to undermine the forcefulness of his earlier conclusions. After an all-too-brief examination of the “independent” impact of historical circumstances, Kreuzer concludes, “the systematic institutional effects are too weak to displace the nonsystematic, contextual effects” (p. 160). Not only is this claim unsupported by the limited evidence presented in this chapter, but it also makes the reader wonder why Kreuzer focused on the “less” important institutional factors in the first place.

That said, the rest of the chapter reaffirms the centrality of Kreuzer’s explanatory variables for understanding democratic health and regime stability. He once again looks to the role of institutions, but this time, the emphasis is on their part in shaping the configuration of the party system. Kreuzer nicely draws the connection between the behavior of candidates—the focus of the book—and the behavior of parties. Indeed, despite Kreuzer’s earlier remark to the contrary, the reader will be convinced of his concluding claims: “institutional incentives determined the innovativeness of parties . . . [and] . . . innovation matters for democracy” (p. 169).

As part of a literature typically devoted to the behavior of “modern” (i.e., post-1945) parties, Kreuzer’s work is refreshing. He effortlessly applies hypotheses about the effect of institutional constraints on rational, office-seeking actors to a set of parties more often depicted as ideologically driven, elite-oriented clubs (Bracher, 1982; Fritzsche, 1993). He supports his theoretical arguments with copious, in-depth historical evidence. Although such an approach is not as unusual as Kreuzer asks us to believe, this mixture of rich case material with a parsimonious, potentially generalizable theory is methodologically satisfying. His arguments would have been even more convincing had he incorporated some of the abundant primary sources available in French and German party archives.

Although he attempts to participate in the well-established academic discussion of interwar party behavior, Kreuzer does not give the reader a concrete sense of his main theoretical competitors. He briefly mentions his objections to the reductionist approaches of political science and the exceptionalist explanations of history, but these criticisms are not linked to specific accounts of party development in the French

Third Republic and Weimar Germany. Moreover, Kreuzer does not consider the possibility that factors other than institutions or the vagaries of the historical context could foster party innovation. For example, much is known about the leader of the Nazi party. What role did Hitler play in the electoral and political maneuvering of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei? Were French parties on the whole less susceptible to the problems of internal factionalism than their German counterparts? These questions are not entertained.

Even if Kreuzer's argument can withstand the challenges of these leadership- and organization-centered alternatives, the credibility of his findings is reduced by his failure to consider the effects of another political factor, namely, the strategic interaction of parties. As authors from Downs (1957) to Kitschelt (1994) have convincingly argued, parties do not adapt to conditions, whether institutional changes or economic crises, in a vacuum. Their behavior, and that of their candidates, is influenced by other parties in the system. Because Kreuzer arranges his analyses to highlight cross-national party comparisons, he makes little reference to the interaction of parties within a given country. The reader is left wondering how much of a party's electoral failure is due to its constrained response to external crises as opposed to its strategic outmaneuvering by a political opponent. As Kreuzer himself admits in a rare discussion of party interaction, the electoral demise, or maladaptation, of the German conservative parties was integrally linked to the rise of the Nazis (pp. 113-116). Acknowledging that parties can be strategic also raises doubts about the exogeneity of Kreuzer's institutional factors. He never discusses the rationale behind Weimar Germany's all-important shift to PR rules in 1918. Just as the French Socialists altered the electoral rules in 1986 to hurt their Conservative Party opponents, is it not possible that the institutional change in Weimar Germany 68 years earlier was also a calculated strategy to change the balance of the party system? Such a possibility highlights the need to examine party interaction when explaining the electoral support received by a party or the survival of a democratic regime.

Nevertheless, *Institutions and Innovations* makes important contributions to the literature on both democratization and political parties. To the first, it brings further evidence of the critical role of political actors in the consolidation and demise of democratic regimes. To the second, it provides a stimulating and well-substantiated example of how modern institutional theories of party behavior are equally applicable to the "premodern" world of party politics. Although Kreuzer does not allay every concern of this reader, his book provides food for thought for historians and political scientists alike.

REFERENCES

- Bracher, K. D. (1982). *Zeit der Ideologien: Eine Geschichte politischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Fritzsche, P. (1993). Breakdown or breakthrough? Conservatives and the November revolution. In L. E. Jones & J. Retallack (Eds.), *Between reform, reaction, and resistance: Studies in the history of German conservatism from 1789 to 1945* (pp. 299-328). Providence, RI: Berg.
- Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The transformation of European social democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, S., & Scully, T. R. (1995). Introduction: Party systems in Latin America. In S. Mainwaring & T. R. Scully (Eds.), *Building democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin America* (pp. 1-34). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Pridham, G., & Lewis, P. (1996). Introduction: Stabilising fragile democracies and party system development. In G. Pridham & P. Lewis (Eds.), *Stabilising fragile democracies: Comparing new party systems in Southern and Eastern Europe* (pp. 1-22). London: Routledge.
- Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2001). Old parties and new democracies: Do they bring out the best in one another? *Party Politics*, 7(5), 581-604.

Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons From Eastern Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 337 pp. Cloth, \$59.95.

Oxana Shevel, Harvard University

In *Resistance and Rebellion*, Roger Petersen produces an insightful and detailed analysis of the process that leads ordinary people to become involved in resistance and rebellion against powerful regimes. Because the units of analysis in the book are individuals and face-to-face communities rather than nations, the book will be of particular interest to those interested in resistance and political violence as individual-level actions. With the bulk of empirical material centered on the Lithuanian resistance in the 1940s, the book will also be of particular interest to scholars of Lithuania. The book's rich empirical material draws from extensive interviews with the participants in the Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance. Detailed analysis of the resistance experiences of individuals and communities in Lithuania is smoothly integrated with a discussion of the larger historical and political context in which these resistance activities took place, thus making the book a valuable source to both experts on Lithuania and readers with less knowledge of the area.

To answer the question that drives the book—How do ordinary people come to resist and rebel against powerful regimes?—Petersen begins by developing an analytically crisp conceptualization of resistance as an action located on a spectrum of possible individual roles (coded from -3 to +3) that range from various degrees of collaboration (the negative end of the spectrum) through neutrality (0); nonviolent, unorganized resistance (+1); participation in a locally based armed organization (+2); to participation in an armed, mobile rebel organization such as a guerilla army (+3). Ten “triggering” and “sustaining” mechanisms are then identified that work in sequence to drive individuals along this spectrum of multiple possible roles. These mechanisms and the logic of their effects are discussed in the theoretical chapters of the book (the Introduction and Chapter 1). Four mechanisms trigger a movement from neutrality to unorganized, nonviolent resistance (resentment formation, threshold-

based safety calculations with society-wide references, focal points that communicate resentment and risk acceptance, and community-based status rewards and sanctions); two mechanisms further trigger movements into armed, organized resistance organizations (threshold-based safety calculations based on community-wide references and community-based norms of reciprocity); and four mechanisms help sustain armed resistance organizations (threats plus three irrational psychological mechanisms: the value of small victories, the tyranny of sunk costs, and wishful thinking).

Once a theory of 10 mechanisms driving the actions of individuals along the spectrum of resistance is laid out, the substantive chapters of the book (Chapters 3 through 9) show these mechanisms at play via resistance and rebellion in 20th-century Eastern Europe. Empirical material about Lithuanian anti-Soviet resistance (in the periods from 1940 to 1941, 1945 to 1954, and the perestroika period of the late 1980s) constitutes the bulk of the empirical chapters (Chapters 3 to 6 are devoted to Lithuania in the 1940s, and in Chapters 8 and 9, Lithuanian perestroika-era resistance in the period from 1987 to 1991 is analyzed and compared with the resistance in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the same period). Chapter 7 presents additional empirical material from several other 1940s Eastern European cases (Latvia and Estonia; Galicia and Volhynia in Ukraine, central Ukraine, and Byelorussia; and Montenegro). Resistance in these states is compared by applying the “mechanisms approach” of the book.

Perhaps the most interesting contribution of the book is Petersen’s analysis of the properties of a community that make rebellion against strong regimes possible. This analysis has implications reaching beyond the Lithuanian and Eastern European cases. The structural features of a community that are conducive to the initiation and sustaining of rebellion against strong regimes that Petersen identifies (the density, centralization, and homogeneity of the community and the structural positions of first actors or political entrepreneurs within the community) are generalizable. The identified community characteristics allow one to generate predictions for resistance activities in other geographical and historical settings. An important insight of Petersen’s analysis is that “properties of the community that make rebellion against strong regime possible should be seen not in urban-rural, peasant-worker, but rather along more abstract, generalizable, and, importantly, non-partisan dimensions” (p. 152). At the same time, the structural characteristics of a community are only part of the book’s theoretical approach, and the mechanisms approach and the book as a whole do not constitute a generalizable theory of resistance and rebellion, especially at the national level.

As Petersen himself states, the mechanisms approach he employs “aims for explanation over prediction” (p. 12), and the units of analysis in the book are individuals and communities, not nations (p. 8). As such, the part of the book devoted to cross-national comparisons of Eastern European cases in the 1940s and 1980s is weaker and less persuasive than the part devoted to micro-level analysis of the Lithuanian case. The author correctly argues that national culture and history cannot explain individual or regional variation in rebellion activity within a group that shares similar national history and myths. The mechanisms approach may indeed be a more suitable analytical tool when the task is to explain individual- and community-level variation

in resistance within a given nation. However, at the level of cross-national comparisons of resistance and rebellion activities that the book also attempts, the mechanisms approach competes with historical, cultural, and structural explanations. At this level, the mechanisms approach does not offer an entirely satisfying alternative to rival explanations.

Reading the cross-national chapters leaves the impression that some, if not all, of the cross-national (and some cross-regional) variations in rebellion activities discussed in the book can be explained with references to different historical experiences and/or structural features of the respective countries and regions, without revoking the system of mechanisms. For example, although Petersen lists the presence and depth of resentment against a particular oppressive regime as one of the mechanisms that trigger resistance, this resentment is also a product of historical experiences (the same could be said about another mechanism, the presence of focal points based around particular national myths or historical events). In this regard, historical experience (and/or national myths) seems to be an equally satisfying explanation of variation in resistance to a particular regime among national and subnational communities that have had different historical experiences. Although resentment and focal points can be called mechanisms, this labeling adds little in terms of explanatory power. Variation in resistance among nations can be explained by alternative theories such as history and/or the strength of national sentiments, which the mechanisms approach does not quite satisfactorily refute. The same can be said with regard to the variation in resistance among regions within the same nation that have had very different historical experiences (e.g., Vohlynia and Galicia in Ukraine, among the examples used in the book). Nevertheless, Petersen's fine-grained analysis of historical examples of resistance and rebellion that illuminates how various mechanisms work in sequence to push and pull individuals along the spectrum of possible activities during resistance is an important and interesting contribution to the study of resistance, rebellion, and political violence.