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essay on Weber and medieval studies, Gerhard Dilcher summarizes this Weberian typology, which divides — perhaps simple-mindedly — the ancient world between east/west, and then medieval Europe between north/south.

The three closing essays on Weber and the "Russian," "Indian," and "Chinese" city by Manfred Hildermeier, Michael Mann, and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, respectively, share a common complaint. Just as Weber used the ancient world as a negative contrast to the medieval city, these "oriental" or "nonoccidental" cities serve Weber's analysis as convenient foils. As Hildermeier claims, Weber never developed an adequate category for Russian urban development, although prerevolution bourgeois Russian historians sponsored a significant Weber reception in Russia (*Veberianstvo*). According to Mann, Weber based his account of the Indian city on badly dated colonial scholarship. Schmidt-Glintzer suggests that Weber's Western obsession makes his sociology close to useless for understanding Chinese urban development. Although sanguine about the value of Weber's comparative method, Schmidt-Glintzer questions whether one can even elaborate a compelling transhistorical, cross-cultural definition of the city.

Understandably, the closing essays in this collection are the most critical. But the other contributions likewise evince skepticism of Weber's sweeping typologies and often incongruous comparisons. As historians of various methodological and geographic specializations, however, all ten contributors recognize the distinction between Weber's sociology, with its reliance on ideal-typical characterizations, and historical scholarship. Moreover, as all those represented here seem to agree that Weber's intriguing comparisons and typologies have and continue to offer useful stimulus for significant scholarship. Despite some repetition, the essays themselves are complementary, and build, almost fugue-like, to develop and explore the themes of not only *Die Stadt*, but also of Weber's broader sociology.

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Institutions and Innovation: Voters, Parties and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy — France and Germany, 1870–1939. By Marcus Kreuzer. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2001. Pp. vii + 210. $55.00. ISBN 0-472-11186-8.

Why did the Weimar Republic collapse under the weight of economic, social, and political crises in the 1930s while the French Third Republic — exposed to the same strains — bore the weight and survived? Why did middle-class and conservative parties in France prove hardier than their German counterparts?

Why did the communist and fascist parties that gained solid footholds in Germany batter against the electoral walls in France, but fail to break through? These are the interesting questions posed by this comparative work of political science, and the answers are sure to prove useful to historians, but also to nation-builders all over the world.

If the reader can overlook the occasional and egregious lapses of style in this book — "macrohistorical accounts often view parties as epiphenomenological proxies of large-scale, sociohistorical forces" (p. 2) — there is much to be gleaned. The challenge for European parties in the decades between Bismarck and Hitler was to adapt themselves to four new realities: mass politics, economic crisis, electoral volatility, and fragmentation, the latter referring to the gradual but steady erosion of solid old parties into rumps and splinter factions. If unregulated, these new realities threatened to destroy democracy. *Völkisch* or Marxist movements would whip up hatred and intolerance. Economic crisis would upend liberal democracy. Electoral volatility and the steady process of fragmentation would shatter parliamentary blocs and leave an opening for strongmen or demagogues.

France weathered the storm, Germany did not, and Marcus Kreuzer's careful analysis tells us why. Furious with Bismarck and the Hohenzollern emperors, the founders of the German Republic in 1919 sought to erase the sins of *Sammlung*, Prussian three-class voting, and the despotic "empire state." German parties after 1918 had no need to amass a minimum number of votes, rather seats were distributed in "one of the purest forms of proportional representation ever designed." Whereas France had just three seats per electoral district, the Germans had eighteen, which meant that even derisory fringe parties could get one. The Germans also provided "national adjustment seats" to assure a perfect distribution of places in parliament. Tiny pockets of support here and there could be combined and rewarded with a "national adjustment seat." This was clearly an incentive to fragmentation: why not break off from the SPD or the Agrarians if you were certain to regain your seat anyway? Electoral volatility followed, as German voters roved freely between small, hard-edged parties that hardly spoke with one another. German politicians had no need to make political alliances because the PR system guaranteed their individual survival. German voters "could vote their preferences without having to discount them with their probability of winning." Arriving on the scene in the 1920s, Hitler and the Nazis found it easy to manipulate and break the Weimar Republic by driving wedges into the cracks that opened between a bewildering profusion of new parties: the DDP, the DVP, the DNVP, and so on.

In contrast to the Weimar Republic, France retained the double ballot system that the Germans too had used until 1918. Under such a system, candidates had to win an absolute majority (greater than 50 percent) on the first ballot to secure election. Failing that, leading candidates entered in a second election,

where the seat was given to the winner of the runoff ballot. What this meant in practice was clear: voters could vote promiscuously in a first ballot, but then had to vote *strategically* in the second. For their part, candidates were forced to jettison radical policies to reduce their own "career uncertainty." These strategic moves by French voters and politicians alike tended to coalesce power in the mainstream parties, which built coalitions for the second ballot, which, in turn, anchored parliament.

Overall, the French system "preempted the translation of France's social polarization into political polarization." To win election, French communists and fascists felt compelled to moderate or even reject their ideological orthodoxy in order to enter electoral politics. Cross-party blocs characterized the French system: the *bloc national*, the *cartel des gauches*, the *front populaire*. Whereas the Third Republic was notorious for this "fluid factionalism" — parties haggling, compromising, and blending — the Weimar Republic was guilty of the opposite sin: "impermeable segmentation." Proud, ideologically pure splinter groups refused to close ranks against the Nazi menace. Indeed the Germans' first instinct was never to combine or coordinate — there was no need to — rather to use the slumping economy and eroding sense of security to wring a few more voters and "adjustment seats" out of the disgruntled electorate.

Kreuzer makes important points in this book. Electoral politics are a crucial "subplot" in history. They create the incentives that make or break a democracy. Those Frenchmen (there were many) who deplored the *immobilisme* and cynicism of the Third Republic were at least spared the tyrannical horrors that followed the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

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The Unwritten Order: Hitler's Role in the Final Solution. By Peter Longerich. Stroud (Gloucestershire): Tempus. 2001. Pp. 160. $21.99. ISBN 0–7524–1977–3.

For *The Unwritten Order* Peter Longerich combined and recast the two expert reports — one on the Holocaust as systematic policy in Hitler's Germany, the other on Hitler's own key role in that policy — that he prepared for the defense in a lawsuit brought by David Irving against the historian Deborah Lipstadt and the publisher of her 1993 book *Denying the Holocaust.* Irving resented being featured by Lipstadt among the Holocaust deniers even while he did repeatedly cast doubt both on the magnitude of the Holocaust and on Hitler's decisive responsibility for it. The court, which duly found against Irving, required such demonstrations as Longerich provided, especially as no signed order by Hitler

for the Holocaust exists, even if outside the court it hardly needed proving th Hitler was obsessed with Jews, that his word was law in his Reich, and that mi lions of Jews perished in German-controlled Europe by what therefore mu have been Hitler's will. The court had to be told in particular that Hitler's orde were oral as a rule in such sensitive matters as mass murder, though this is n more scholarly news than anything else in Longerich's text. At the same tim the original juridical purpose of that text drastically limits its relevance to th important issues surrounding Hitler's role in the Final Solution.

Insofar as Longerich does nonetheless graze those issues, he largely confus them. To take the biggest case in point, Longerich recognizes expansionism central to Hitler's politics along with anti-Semitism (pp. 24, 26). So far, so goo — with the proviso that anti-Semitism was the closer of the two to Hitler's har heart. But Longerich also sees these two pivotal terms of Hitler's politics as ide ology-driven in unison. Here he has it woefully wrong. Hitler's justification fc his war on the Jews was that they were global parasites destroying their ho peoples, especially the Germans, from within. It followed that Germany's inter est was to promote Jewish emigration from Germany, preferably to prospectiv enemy countries, until Germany achieved the world power needed to quas that world menace. To brutalize Germany's Jews before then would only invit reprisals from other Jew-ridden nations. By the same token, for Germany t export anti-Semitism instead of Jews or to expend vital resources in wartim ridding other nations of their Jews would be self-defeating. Hitler saw all thi clearly, and spoke and acted accordingly, so long as he could control his deadl hate for the Jews. But that deadly hate began to slip out of control after th Munich Pact as he promoted the persecution of German Jews, pushed anti Semitism abroad, and foretold the end of Jewry in Europe. It won ou definitively once German military expansion put more Jews at his mercy tha he could resist killing ahead of schedule. As of 1941, when he definitively pri oritized the Jew-kill over the landgrab, Hitler scrapped his own hard-won rec onciliation of the two in theory and practice. Longerich attributes thi "irrational" priority to a momentum built up by the exterminations themselve (p. 113). But Hitler never let momentum govern Jewish policy: witness hi speech of 29 April 1937 to local Nazi leaders shrilly calling off mounting grass roots initiatives to identify Jewish shops. Longerich simply misses the crucia tension between race and space inherent in Hitlerism.

In this same vein, Longerich writes that "throughout his political career . . Hitler wished to put an end to the existence of Jews within the 'living space [*Lebensraum*] of the German people" (p. 15), whereas on the contrary for long years before he got his ideological act together Hitler vacillated between proposing to rid Germany only or the whole world of Jews. It does not help that Longerich promptly substitutes "the Jews of Europe" for those Jews within Germany's living space (p. 15), then reverts to the removal of Jews "from