

**Response to Cusack, Iversen and Sokice's 2010 APSA Article and
Web Appendix**

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Background:

This draft responds to Cusack, Iversen and Soskice's 2010 article and Web Appendix on the origins of electoral systems and thus is part of an ongoing exchange between us. This exchange focuses primarily on the plausibility of their theoretical assertions and the accuracy with which they interpret the historical evidence they use for their quantitative analysis. My 2010 article raised objections on both these scores that their 2010 article however vigorously rejected.

The APSR publication protocol does not permit responses to responses (my article was considered a response to their 2007 article) and thus did not allow me to address the objections that CIS raised both in their article as well as their web appendix. I therefore decided to post this response on my webpage. It looks at four specific issues raised by CIS: i) Saxony offers evidence for the plausibility of their causal claims, ii) their argument does not apply to Eastern Europe; iii) all but one of the coding errors that I identified were incorrect, iv) I misinterpreted parties' electoral system preferences.

This draft is not a fully developed article but takes the form a loosely structured memo or appendix. It follows directly the structure of CIS 2010 and web appendix to facilitate the comparison of our competing claims. It also is part of a larger research project on the origins of electoral systems and thus will amended as my research progresses. I therefore might periodically post updated versions of this draft on my webpage.

Finally, I welcome any suggestions or comments that will improve this analysis.

The page number in the later sections of this draft correspond to the page number in CIS Web Appendix.

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Section 1: Plausibility of Causal Mechanisms

Kreuzer' 2010 article questioned the plausibility and lack of evidence of CIS' theoretical assertion that labor markets decisively shape the electoral system preferences of economic interest groups who in turn have sufficient influence over parties to directly affect electoral system choice. CIS took this original concern seriously and devote half of their response to evidence from electoral reform debates in three German states, Baden, Württemberg, and Saxony, between 1890 and 1910. CIS' case study addresses what could be called the invisible variable bias; they are offering evidence for a variable that is stipulated by their theory and statistically tested, but has heretofore been historically under-documented and thus remains invisible. They cautiously characterize their findings as offering "whiffs of smoke", rather than smoking gun.

CIS document these invisible variables by consulting a number of well respected historians who focus on economic conditions, interest groups, political parties, electoral politics and institutional reforms in Saxony, Baden and Württemberg before World War I. CIS draw on these historians' historical knowledge in such a selective manner that they in effect engage in context stripping. I would like to illustrate the bias in their selection of historical knowledge by contrasting their theory's central causal elements - whose plausibility historical knowledge is trying to establish - with the historical knowledge contained in the narratives that a) confirms their theory and is reported, b) contradicts their theory and is not reported, c) contradicts their theory and is reported. Context stripping, and ultimately the plausibility of their theory, can be assessed by evaluating both the confirming and disconfirming evidence and the judiciousness with which both are reported.

Table 1 replicates the plausibility probe for which CIS draw evidence from the Saxon case. It does not replicate their evidence for Baden or Württemberg since CIS present them as the weaker of the three cases. To further expedite matters, I present the evidence in tabular form. The first column in Table 1 lists the discreet elements of CIS' causal argument, the second column the confirming evidence that

75 CIS found and present, and the third column reports disconfirming and unreported
evidence. The third column therefore summarizes the context that CIS stripped from
historical narratives. As CIS do not report any disconfirming evidence in the Saxon
case, there was not need for a fourth column. The following paragraphs discuss in
some detail the information that CIS did or did not report so that we can assess
80 more closely the extent of their context stripping. I will pay most attention to the
shaded boxes in the third column and assesses to what extent these unreported and
disconfirming pieces of evidence amount to context stripping and thereby
undermines the plausibility of CIS' causal argument.

CIS Causal Logic	Confirming & Reported Evidence	Disconfirming & Un-reported Evidence
1) Presence of skill intensive, manufacturing based, export sector (SIMES)	Strong	None
2) Increasing organization of SIMES	Strong	None
2) Desire for more effective political representation of SIMES	Strong	None
4) Investment in skill formation central economic concern for SIMES	No evidence	Tariffs, taxation, strength of unions. Also motivated by non-economic goals.
5) Close and direct influence of SIMES in political parties	Strong	None
6) Interested in electoral reform by SIMES	Strong	None
7) PR important objective of electoral reform	Limited evidence	Franchise central issue, no preference for PR.
8) Cooperation between SIMES and workers, socialists	Weak	Evidence of conflict

85 The second column indicates that the historical narratives on which CIS draw
supports significant element of CIS' larger causal model. There is little dispute that
Saxony had indeed a large, skill-intensive and export dependent manufacturing
sector that was largely unorganized until 1902. Gustave Streseman's formation of

the Verband Sächsischer Industriellen (VSI) organized this sector into an effective
90 lobby which quickly came to dominate the Saxon branch of the National Liberal
Party. (NLP) Finally, one the key motivation for this foray into electoral and party
politics was electoral reform. The second column also raises doubts about CIS'
theory because the historical narratives contain no evidence supporting CIS' claim
that electoral reform was motivated to assure social policies that would support
95 adequate skill formation. The absence of such evidence leaves unexplained
Stresemann and the VSI's motivation for supporting electoral reform. The plausibility
of CIS's theory therefore depends on the fact that CIS do not report motivations for
electoral reforms that are reported in the historical narratives and that disconfirm
their economic argument.

100 The grey cells in column three lists the factors that disconfirm their theory
and which CIS leave out. Their decision to *not* select these facts clearly biases how
they use historical knowledge to support the plausibility of their theory. To
illustrate that CIS did not just strip some tangential contextual evidence but the very
key arguments of their historical thesis, let me quickly elaborate the three key
105 contextual pieces of historical knowledge they stripped from the narratives.

Economic Motivations: The key economic motivation that drove the Saxon
export oriented, small size manufacturing sector to enter politics were import
tariffs. Such tariffs were important because they increased the costs of raw
materials and threatened access to export markets. Other minor economic concerns
110 mentioned in historical narratives were taxation, the threat mechanization posed
from small-scale manufacturers, costs of big business cartels, and the increasing
power of unions. (Warren 1964, 12-4, 30-4, 40, 54-8; Wright 2004, 33, 48-9) Two
things are worth underline about these economic concerns. First, skill formation and
vocational training is never mentioned as an important economic concern. Second,
115 the economic concerns of the VSI pitted small to medium sized manufacturers
against larger heavy industry and agriculture.¹ It thus involved sectoral conflicts

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¹ One of Stresemann's key accomplishments was to convince Saxon manufacturers that lobbying was insufficient to effectively represent their economic interests and that only electoral reform that

within the private sector that stands in stark contrast the alleged cross-sectoral consensus *across* such sectors which CIS emphasize.²

Electoral Reform: CIS offer only a vague account about the specific electoral reform proposals discussed between 1903 and 1909 by the Saxon Landtag and reported in the historical narratives. Their vague account leaves out two elements that are inconsistent with their theory. First, the electoral reforms considered between 1903 and 1909 focused almost exclusively on expanding the franchise while changing the electoral system to a PR system was a minor issue that never made it out of the parliamentary committee stages.³ (Retallack 1990, 296, 9, 301, 2) Second, VSI and NLP opposed PR and strongly favored a plural vote franchise to contain the Socialists' legislative strength. The NLP and Conservatives both failed to support the complicated PR proposal put forth the Saxon government which meant that it was not included in the final 1909 electoral bill.⁴ (Retallack 1990, 302-03) The NLP's support for plural vote franchise was part of their effort to find a solution to the threat posed by the Socialists in Saxony that was not as draconian as the 1896 three class franchise, which carried the risk of further radicalizing the left, but at the same not so universal that it would assure a socialist parliamentary majority.⁵ (Retallack 1990, 301; Warren 1964, 83-90) Plural voting seems to the NLP the perfect to tool for this fine political line. (Retallack 1990, 291; Warren 1964, 63)

Cross-Class Cooperation: CIS are correct that the NLP cooperated with the SPD on the 1909 electoral reform but it is only by stripping larger political context

137 would weaken the political power of heavy industry and agriculture would accomplish this goal. Electoral reform therefore was driven by conflict with the business sector and not by cross-class cooperation centered on skill formation.

² Isabella Mares and Peter Swenson emphasize the heterogeneity of business interests as well. (2003 ; 2002)

³ The PR provision in the electoral law was introduced, not by the NLP, but the Saxon executive which, just like the Imperial executive, was appointed by the Saxon King (Saxony had its own monarchy) and did not depend for its survival on parliamentary majorities. (Retallack 1990, 302-03)

⁴ Interestingly enough, the National Liberals and Stresemann were unswayed by the governments' very plausible claim that PR would ease the coordination problem between National Liberals and Conservatives that contributes SPD's win of 23 out the 25 Saxon seats in the 1903 Reichstagsselection. (Retallack 1990, 302-03)

⁵ It is to this dilemma that the lengthy passage that CIS cite from Retallack refers and not, as CIS seem to imply, consideration of PR as a solution for better cross-class collaboration. (For quote see Cusack et al. 2010a, 400)

of this cooperation that it fits their theory. The accounts by Retallack and Warren make it clear that the NLP's cooperation with the SPD was purely tactical and aimed to curtail the parliamentary dominance of Conservatives; there is no indication that it was part of a longer-term cross-class collaboration centered on skill formation and social policy. Liberals needed at least quiet acquiescence of Socialists to reform the 1896 three-class franchise which had cemented the Conservatives' dominance. (Warren 1964, 68-72; Wright 2004, 60; Pohl 1995, 210) Warren wrote that "the Saxon business lobby did not set itself up as the implacable class enemy of the workers. Their [i.e. workers] political neutrality was still needed if reaction was to be cut down in the Saxon Landtag." (1964, 74, 89) So, whatever limited cooperation occurred between the NLP and the SPD owed more to the political struggles to democratize Germany and the economic conflicts between small, skill manufacturing and heavy industry and agriculture than long-term collaboration centered on skill formation.⁶

CIS' stripping of much of the aforementioned contextual information creates the false impression that the Saxony case supports their theory. The bias in this context stripping stems from CIS' omission of central elements of the vary sources they consult. It is important to underscore that the charge here is not that they omitted variables in sources they did *not* cite. By that standard, every scholar leaves something out and invariably falls short; context stripping then would become a meaningless epithet readily hurled at everybody trying to generalize. If, however, we confine context stripping to the biased selection of historical knowledge from the very narratives social scientists consult, then remains a more useful form of historical selection bias.

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⁶ Retallack and Warren also cite several examples of outright conflict between labor and Saxon's manufacturing sector. Streseman and the VSI strongly sided with management in a landmark labor dispute that took place in 1903 in Saxony's textile industry. Reflecting on the resounding defeat of labor in this dispute, Streseman wrote "He who wants [labor] peace must arm for war." Three years later, he founded an anti-strike insurance company to allow small business to better withstand strikes. (Warren 1964, 40-4, 72; Wright 2004, 37) Finally, the NLP supported the draconian franchise restriction of the 1896 franchise which cost the SPD the fifteen seats it previously held in the Saxon Landtag. (Warren 1964, 18-23, 78-80)

Section 2: East European Sample

The inclusion of the East European cases in CIS's sample had the most negative impact on their statistical findings; it eliminated the significance of the correlation coefficient and significantly increased the standard error. CIS therefore go to great length arguing why the inclusion of the East European cases biases their sample and therefore should be excluded.

Pages: 1, 14, 15 **Claim:** Inadequate citations in Appendix C1 that focuses on Eastern Europe.

Response: CIS more specifically claim that Appendix C1 dealing with the East European cases only uses one source (i.e. Braunias), and that this source does not cover economic issues and fails to provide page numbers. Let me take up these two issues in turn

1) No sources for labor market coding: CIS are correct that Table C1 does not give any sources for my labor market codings. I did not think it necessary to add the references with the table since the narrative following immediately after the table presents detailed economic evidence and includes the relevant citations. By all accounts, CIS must have read this narrative because they subsequently disagree with some of the evidence it reports. The only source the table cites Braunias because I used him to calculate the threshold values reported in Table C1. These values are not discussed in the narrative following the table thus leading me to place the citations at the end of the table.

2) No page numbers: The Braunias reference contains indeed no page numbers. This omission of page numbers is customary in instances when multiple pieces of information are taken from handbook-type sources like Braunias. They systematic organization of information in such handbooks makes it easy to find the information and thus obviates the need for numerous page numbers. All the same, I admire CIS' new found religious fervor for fully referenced footnotes.

Pages: 1, 14, 15 **Claim:** Eastern Europe was not industrialized and thus should have been excluded from my replication

Response: I was unable to find any direct specification in their original article that identifies industrialization as precondition for their model to apply. Their theoretical argument vaguely implies industrialization as a condition for the adoption of PR since it causally links the former to the latter.

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However, they also point out that the lack of industrialization in early 19th century explained why there was no pressure for PR during this time period. Plus, they include agrarian economies like Ireland, Finland, and New Zealand in their original sample. So, it seems not unreasonable to infer from this, and the absence of any explicit mentioning to the contrary, that their argument applies equally to industrialized and non-industrialized countries.

Pages: 1, 14 & 15 **Claim:** Eastern Europe was not democratized and thus should be excluded from my replication

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Response: I was unable to find any direct specification in their original article that identifies democratization as precondition for their model to apply. Any such specification would, to be meaningful, have required detailed specification of what they consider as democracy and non-democracy. Such specifications would have been needed to clarify why countries like pre 1918-Japan, Germany, Austria and Finland with their imperial constitutions, highly restricted parliamentary sovereignty, and oftentimes restrictive franchises were classified as democracies or at the very least more democratic than the East European cases. Moreover, the exclusion of Eastern European cases like Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania would have been inconsistent with the inclusion of Austria since significant territories of all four cases were part of the same Austro-Hungarian Empire. If their sampling is based on the post-1918 regime characteristics, which their dismissal of Hungary and Romania implies, they would have to explain why the regime that followed the adoption of an electoral system was relevant for explaining its initial choice.

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Page: 1, 14 **Claim:** I include Hungary in my East European sample even though Braunias, my alleged only source for Eastern Europe, does not discuss Hungary.

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Response: CIS are correct that Braunias does not discuss Hungary as there is no entry under the letter "H". Karl Braunias' *Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht* is written in German and the German spelling for Hungary is "Ungarn." If Braunias is consulted under the letter "U", the reader will indeed find a detailed discussion of Hungary's electoral laws. Unfortunately, though, rudimentary proficiency in German is required to make this discovery.

Section 3: Labor Market Index

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Page: 2 **Claim:** French rural cooperatives were weak before 1918.

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Response: CIS point out that France indeed had rural cooperatives before 1918 but that they were qualitatively different from those found in coordinated market economies. They point to two differences in particular. First, French rural cooperatives were only marginally autonomous and self-organizing as they frequently were controlled by republican and conservative politicians to help in their electoral efforts. Second, French cooperatives were not part of a rural industrialization process and thus did not have any forward linkages to industry. The sources CIS cite show that French cooperatives indeed lacked these characteristics and that consequently should not have recoded.

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CIS' discussion of the French case in their Web Appendix clarifies the operationalization of rural cooperatives they put forth in their 2007 article. In trying to verify their claims on French cooperatives, I came across a unexpectedly large literature on economic cooperatives . (Fairbairn 1994 ; Fairbairn 2000 ; Peal 1988 ; Guinnane 2001 ; Faust 1977 ; Birchall 1997) This literature confirms Katzenstein and CIS' contention that rural cooperatives constituted an important effort by rural actors to coordinate market outcomes and in the process linking agricultural production with other economic sectors.

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However, this literature also raises a number of new questions about economic cooperatives:

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1) One source identifies Norwegian rural cooperatives, contrary to CIS coding, as weak. Focusing on Scandinavia and Germany, Heinrich Pudor, points out that for the period before 1901 "one cannot talk about rural cooperatives in Norway." (Pudor 1904, 107-08) CIS thus would either have to recode Norway or further clarify their coding criteria to explain their coding of Norway.

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2) The literature on economic cooperatives discusses rural cooperatives as only one of several forms of cooperatives. It particularly singles out consumer cooperatives as coordinating the economic interests of urban, working class consumers in very similar ways as rural cooperatives did for rural producers. (Furlough and Strikwerda 1999 ; Faust 1977) Consumer

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cooperatives were also self-help, collective action solving institutions.⁷ Given that such consumer cooperatives were common in many uncoordinated market economies, it would be important for to explain why they excluded consumer cooperatives. Baker et al. conducted an extensive study of cooperatives in interwar Europe and provide one of the few comparative data on the strength of cooperative enterprises. Unfortunately, they only present data for 1930s and thus permit a very rough estimate of what the strength of cooperative might have been before 1918. This data confirms CIS' codings for rural cooperatives in coordinated market economies and, by 1930s, even for the Norwegian case. However, if we look at consumer cooperatives, we find that they played an important role in the UK in the UK comprising 16.2% of the population.⁸ Baker et al. further report that these cooperatives controlled 12% of retail trade and employed 275,000 people. (Baker et al. 1937, 27) There also is strong indication that consumer and other forms of cooperatives played an important role in Canada, another un-coordinated market economy. (Fairbairn 1989 ; Birchall 1997, 195-96, 203-04, 7-10)

	Rural Coop	Consumer Coops
Czechoslovakia	7.6	5.6
Denmark	29.6	9.5
Finland	12.2	13.7
France	4.5	6.1
UK	1.6	16.2
Norway	10.2	4.9
Sweden	15.9	9.1
Switzerland	12.8	9.9

Note: Percentage for rural cooperatives based on size of rural population, percentage for consumer cooperatives based on entire population. Source: (Baker et al. 1937, 23-4)

Page: 3-4 **Claim:** Employer coordination

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⁷ This broad distinct between rural, producer and urban consumer cooperatives subsumes a much wider variety of economic cooperatives. Jacob Baker et al. identify ten different types of cooperative enterprises in Europe in 1937. (Farmers' Purchasing Societies, Farmers' Marketing Societies, General Purpose Farm Societies, Workers' Productive Societies, Consumers' Distributive Societies, Housing Societies, Utilities, Special Service Societies, Credit and Banking Societies, Insurance Societies. (Baker et al. 1937, 18)

⁸ Heinrich Faust reports that British Consumer societies already well organized in the late 19th century, that is well before the 1930s data reported by Baker et al. (Faust 1977, 123-29)

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Response: CIS contest my original reclassifications of Belgium, Dutch, Italian and Swiss employers coordination. My reclassifications rested on three sources: i) Martin and Swank’s employer coordination index, ii) consulting relevant time periods in Crouch, iii) detailed analysis of Switzerland based on Gruner.

Belgium, Netherlands and Italy: I offered no narrative explanation for the recoding of these three cases. My decision simply was based on Martin and Swank’s coding the degree for employer coordination in Italy, Netherlands and Italy around 1914. Contrary to CIS, they ranked the three countries at the same level as the employer associations in other uncoordinated labor markets thus sharing with them the *absence* of highly centralized business associations. Martin and Swank’s recoding strikes me as more reliable than CIS because they do not simply replicate Crouch’s codings (as do CIS) but go back and draw directly on the sources Crouch used originally. (Martin and Swank 2008, 182, 96-97) CIS offer no reasons to question Martin and Swank’s index and I therefore I see no need to revert to CIS’ original codings of Italy, Netherlands and Italy.⁹

CIS not only fail to effectively question Martin and Swank’s coding, they also unsuccessfully defend Crouch. They make a vague reference that Crouch does “offers no support for Kreuzer’s reclassification.” (Cusack et al. 2010b, 3) I think they are right that Crouch’ anemic, tabular evidence does not provide reliable evidence of *any* coding which is why I preferred Martin and Swank. To illustrate this problem, I reproduce below the information contain in Crouch’s tables. The table illustrates two problems. First, the translation of such cryptic table entries into binary codings in the absence of further coding guidelines is arbitrary at best. Second, the table lists evidence of employer coordination for both 1914 *and* 1925. It does so because CIS, to support their case, repeatedly cite evidence from pages 140-144 in Crouch which covers the employer coordination in 1925. They consequently are trying to use evidence from a period that post-dates the adoption of PR.

In my opinion therefore, CIS do not effectively defend their codings by either demonstrating the superiority of their original evidence or by rebutting the new evidence that I introduced. CIS try to escape from this empirical cul-de-sac by stipulating a new set of criteria for employer coordination that neither Martin and Swank nor Crouch use. They introduce interlocking relationships between banks, cartels and direct government intervention as

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⁹ CIS’ footnote 4 takes issue with my general characterization that Martin and Swank as using a wider evidentiary basis than they do. They ground this charge on the fact both Crouch and Martin and Swank cite only Windmuller for the Dutch case and consulted the same amount of evidence. (Windmuller 1969) They misread my point which was not that Martin and Swank consulted more evidence than they did on the Dutch. Instead, I claimed that Martin and Swank consulted more material than CIS for all the cases since consulted Crouch and all the sources he cites in his appendix. CIS, in turn, only cited Crouch and three other sources thus basing their coding on indeed on a smaller evidentiary base than Martin and Swank. (The three additional sources are: Katzenstein 1985 ; Thelen 2004 ; Swenson 2002)

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further elements of business coordination. On the basis of these ex post specifications, they reclassify Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. In addition to being ex post, I do not find this re-specification of employer coordination very compelling. As a matter of fact, it seems inconsistent with their earlier clarification of rural cooperatives. It maybe recalled that CIS dismissed French rural cooperatives because they were insufficiently “collective-solving institutions” as they were controlled by external actors such as the church and conservative politicians. Given this insistence on genuine, internal self-help, I question to what extent business associations controlled by banks and state be can considered as conflict solving institutions that are any more cooperative than French rural cooperatives.

My recoding of the Swiss is admittedly ambiguous. Martin and Swank rank Swiss business as fairly coordinated before 1918. I agree that Swiss businesses were well organized, but my reading of Gruner was that this organization was highly fragmented before 1918 and only became genuinely coordinated after the experience of W.W. 1. (Gruner 1956).

	Martin & Swank			Crouch	
	1900	1914	1925	1914	1925
Belgium	3.0	3.0	4.0	Scope: growth of organizations in metals, mines, etc. Power: very weak, mainly combating social legislation	Scope: continued growth; Power: very weak, mainly combating social legislation
Netherlands	3.0	3.5	5.0	Scope: some anti-union organization and lock outs; Power: weak	Scope: Strong growth, Power: Rapidly developing coordination
Italy	3.0	3.0	4.5	Scope: some organization in north only; Power: no entry	Confindustria, 1919, & employers organizations (weak) accepts role in structures of fascist state;
Switzerland	4.5	5.0	6.0	Scope: ZSAO, 1908, Scope: as 1900	Scope: growth Power: well developed strike funds

Sources: (Crouch 1993, 112-14, 40-44; Martin and Swank 2008, 182, 96-98)

Page: 5-7 Claim: Centralization of Dutch Unions.

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Response: CIS disagree with my claim that Dutch unions were decentralized. They claim that I under-estimate the importance of the Socialist Union (NVV); and that I did so by selectively quoting from Windmuller and arbitrarily select my dates. The easiest way to rebut these charges is to carefully walk the reader through Windmuller's account.

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Let me just state upfront that I agree with CIS' assertion that the NVV was indeed the largest, most centralized and rapidly growing union in the pre-war Netherlands. If this were the only relevant piece of evidence, as CIS seem to imply, then the Netherlands should indeed be classified as a centralized labor movement. The question, therefore, is how important was the NVV relative to the other unions. Windmuller reports following facts:

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1) by 1914 half of all unionized workers (266,000) were "affiliated with national center rather than independent unions." National center unions included the NVV but were not identical with it. Windmuller gives NVV member of 80,000 for 1914 which means 186,000 of the members belonged to non-socialist unions. (Windmuller 1969, 39) He does not identify these unions but he must be referring to the Protestant and Catholics Unions who had a national center and differed from what originally were independent, local unions. Windmuller also makes it clear that the Catholic and Protest unions were only weakly centralized and internally divided. (Windmuller 1969, 36-7)

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2) He identifies Socialists, Catholics and Protestants as the "three principle groups ... which endured with minor modifications." So despite the Socialists rapid rise, the Catholics and Protestant unions remained central to Dutch labor relations. He also reports that the Netherlands had important local unions "whose organizations rejected any federate ties to a national center." Base on the figures he provides for 1914, this provides the following breakdown: Total unionized workers (266,000), Socialists (80,000, 30%), Protestants (11,000, 4.1%), Catholics (29,000, 10.9%), Syndicalists (10,000, 3.8%), Local Unions (133,000, 50%). (Windmuller 1969, 39)

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3) He reports that trade union members increased significantly during W.W.I. to 683,000 union members accounting for 10% of the population. In 1920, the NVV accounted for one third of union members, Catholics 20%, Protestants 10% and unaffiliated unions for 20%. He gives not indication about the affiliation of remaining 20%. So, the bottom line is that the NVV retained its prewar strength and thus did little to increase the degree of union centralization. (Windmuller 1969, 53-4)

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Based on these facts, I firmly believe the that my original citation of Windmuller conclusion that "the fractionalization of the Dutch labor movement, which sets it off from the labor movements in most countries, began early and remained one of its key features" neither misquotes him nor distorts his evidence. (Windmuller 1969, 40)

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Response: CIS argues that “although at first glance Kreuzer’s description of Swiss unions as fragmented and crafts-based is understandable, we believe it is wrong in terms of our argument.” (Cusack et al. 2010b, 7) I am not sure what they mean “in terms of our argument” or how their evidence rebuts my characterization. They offer no direct rebuttal of the sources I cited. Instead, they cite cantonal level collective agreements for skilled workers which is meant to support their larger argument about cross-class cooperation. They then contradict this evidence when reporting that Swiss employer associations in the “watch, metal and machinery industries rejected collective agreements at the federal until the peace obligation agreement of 1937.” (Cusack et al. 2010b, 7) They leave unexplained why labor and capital cooperated in Geneva in 1900 but not at the federal level until 1937. More importantly, I am unclear how this information relates to the coding of union centralization or how it contradicts much of the evidence they report about the fragmented nature of Swiss unions. It seems as if their examples engage the plausibility of their theoretical argument but even then they offer one piece of evidence that supports it and one that contradicts it.

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Response: I had pointed out that one dimension of the labor market index – the skilled export sector – contains two separate dimensions, namely size of exports and skill profile of employees, that do not necessarily co-vary and therefore needed clarification. I therefore assessed their codings on whether or not they met both qualifications (i.e. large exports, and skill intensive economic sectors which might or might not be for exports). (Kreuzer 2010, 386) Based on this understanding of a “large skilled based export sector”, I recoded four countries (i.e. France, UK, Austria and Denmark).

In their Web Appendix, CIS operationalize “large skilled based export markets” more precisely. They write “that a high share of manufacturing exports is what matters per se [...] our concern here was to identify those countries in which vocational training of workers in manufacturing was important in the early twentieth century.” (Cusack et al. 2010b, 7) They consequently defend their original codings by downplaying the importance of exports and offering detailed evidence about absence or presence of vocational training.

This ex post re-specification of “large scale export sector” by downplaying the importance of exports seems peculiar for two reasons:

- 1) Peter Katzenstein, who is so central to various strands of their arguments, makes export dependence the key factor why small, globally integrated economies are under constant pressure to invest in skill specific vocational

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training. (Katzenstein 1985) CIS offer not alternative reasons why countries would experience comparable *domestic* economic pressure to invest in skill formation. Furthermore, it will be remembered that the pressures for various labor market protections, which in turn necessitated PR, largely came from the risks volatile *international* markets posed for highly trained workers. So logic would dictated that if international markets no longer significantly matter, then labor market protections would neither and the political pressure for PR would be much smaller.

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- 2) Downplaying the importance of exports further muddles the validity of their labor market index by now having in effect three out of the five indicators in effect measuring some aspect of vocational training. Guilds capture the historical origins of vocational training in late 18th and early 19th century, crafts union, by undermining the historical re-production of guild initiated vocational training, measure its survival in the mid to late 19th century, and “large skilled-based export sector” (under its re-definition in the Web Appendix) captures the strength of vocational training around World War 1. Three out of the five dimensions of their labor market index, thus, measure in effect almost identical elements of economic coordination. In doing so, they diminish overall validity of this index.

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Section 4: Party Preferences

General Observations: CIS Web Appendix constitutes their first extensive exploration of parties' actual electoral system preferences. The principle impetus for this foray is their desire to correct the disparities between the actual preferences of actors and those predicted by their model to which my Table 3 points. The sources CIS cite in their Appendix and many of their actual remarks identify preferences shaped by the left threat and more generally to strictly seat maximizing concerns. These intimately political origins of electoral preferences are difficult to reconcile with their structural, economic argument. CIS neither acknowledge this conflict nor do they offer any effective rebuttal. Instead, they are single-mindedly interested in rebutting evidence contradicting their argument and show no interest in using such evidence to modify their theoretical argument.

Page: 10 **Claim:** Danish Socialists changed their preferences rather than being divided on PR.

Response: Elklit reports that in the 1890s and early 1900s Socialists championed redistricting of the existing FPTP electoral rather than straight forward support for PR. He also reports that Danish Socialists supported PR by 1915. (Elklit 2002, 35) The Danish Socialists therefore changed their preference from FPTP to PR, as CIS claim, rather than being divided as I incorrectly argued. This coding mistake of mine also has been confirmed by Elklit. (personal communication)

Page: 11 **Claim:** Danish Liberals supported PR

Response: CIS correctly point out that my Table 3 only lists the preferences of the Venstre party and not those of Social Liberals which broke away from the original Venstre. Venstre indeed supported the 1915 constitutional compromise that introduced mixed electoral system that was more proportional than its predecessor. However, Elklit makes it clear that primary reason for supporting this constitutional compromise was the fact that it reformed the upper house in which the Venstre party was woefully under-presented. He also make no less than five references that the Venstre and their leader Mr. Christensen tried to delay any reforms in the FPTP electoral system under which Liberals were over-represented. "Mr. Christensen's main objective appears to have been to delay, as far as possible,

any major change, in particular in the Folketing [lower house] electoral system.” (Elklit 2002, 35) Moreover, Elklit points out that 1915 constitutional compromise merely introduced a few compensatory seats in two regions that did not create a full-fledged PR system. Venstre’s support for the 1915 compromise thus cannot be taken as evidence that Venstre supported PR. (Elklit, personal communication)

CIS are correct that the Social Liberals (also known as Radical Liberals) supported PR. (Elklit 2002, 35) So maybe the more accurate overall coding for Danish Liberals would have been divided if we take the preferences of its two parties into consideration.

Page: 12 **Claim:** Belgian Socialists and Catholics were divided but the faction opposing PR so marginal that de facto Socialists and Catholics were unified in their support of PR.

Response: CIS are correct that the extra-parliamentary leadership of the Belgian Socialists and its parliamentary caucus were divided on the issue of PR; the former supported PR while the later voting against the PR bill in 1899. CIS also are correct that the 1899 electoral reform bill, which introduced PR, did not remove the multiple voting which Socialist strongly opposed because it benefited the Catholics and Liberals. Plural voting was a concession to Conservatives in return for their willingness to establish of universal franchise in 1891. (Mahaim 1900, 75) While there is no disagreement between CIS and myself on these basic facts, we draw different inferences about how significant the divisions of the Belgian Socialists and Conservatives. CIS consider these divisions as insignificant, whereas I do not. Let me therefore prevent more evidence to back up my initial conclusion.

Conservatives: In the final vote, 70 Catholics voted in favor of PR and 33 against. Such a 2/3 majority certainly indicates a stronger support for PR than for the status quo. CIS interpret this 2/3 majority as reflecting a unified party because the Catholics party leader Beernaerts supported PR. I leave it up to the reader whether this all adds up to a divided or unified party on PR. While we can disagree when precisely a party is or is not divided, there is nothing to disagree on the fact the strictly political, seat maximizing considerations where at the heart of the division within the Catholics. CIS acknowledge this directly when pointing out that the Catholics opposed to PR came from safe rural districts while PR champions came from the more competitive urban districts. CIS might contend that it was in these urban and more industrialized districts that the demands for cross-class collaboration was strongest and that consequently the Catholics’ preferences in these districts is entirely supportive of their theoretical argument. There no evidence in the historical records either of consulted to support this claim; yet, there is plenty of evidence that

consistently and overwhelmingly points in the direction of political, seat maximizing motivations. First, Belgium had a peculiar block vote system in which district magnitude varied tremendously ranging from single member districts to large eight eighteen member districts in many urban centers. Moreover, the block system also awarded all the seats to the largest party thus awarding a de facto huge majority bonus. This block vote system created a tremendous amount of uncertainty for Catholics whose parliamentary majorities oftentimes hinged on whether or not a few thousand seats did or did not go their way in the crucial eighteen seat Bruxelles districts. This uncertainty and the frequent under-representation of Catholics in the urban districts arguably was the primary motivation for the Catholics' support for PR. Second, the majority bonus induced parties to form electoral coalitions to pool their votes. In most instances, this meant Liberals forming coalitions with the Socialists. Catholics were worried that over the long run the Liberals would be amalgamated into the Socialist party thus leaving them to face the Socialists alone. Third, CIS' reading does not explain why Catholics were vehemently opposed to abandoning plural voting which gave them an electoral edge but alienated the Socialists with which Catholics allegedly were willing to cooperate. Given the historical evidence, it is difficult to understand why CIS are so adamant on inferring causality from mere correlation of two historical facts. (Barthelemy 1912 ; Moyne 1970)

Socialists: CIS try to show that the minority group in the socialist party, which opposed PR, was so insignificant that it was not really representative of the party. They constituted the "radical left-wing" of the party that benefited from the old electoral system. They are right that the opponents of PR were regionally concentrated in the Hainaut industrial region and as such were technically a geographic minority. However, in political terms they were anything but a minority since they comprised 30 out of the 35 deputies. These 30 deputies opposed PR in the Nov. 24, 1899 vote. (Goblet d'Alviella 1900, 138-39) Therefore to call a party where the extra-parliamentary leadership and the parliamentary caucus differed on PR as overwhelmingly supporting PR appears to misread the historical record. CIS also seem to imply that the deputies' opposition to PR was less motivated by their views on electoral systems and more by the fact that the 1899 bill did not end plural voting. The implication is that for Socialists the 1899 vote was not so much about the electoral system as it was about the franchise. This again seems a weak argument for two reasons. First, if deputies are more concerned about the franchise than the electoral system, then by implication they value vote maximization more than they would the consensus politics PR produces. And this would directly contradict CIS' central theoretical claim. Second, it overlooks large district magnitude in urban districts and the majority bonus of Belgium's block vote system which strongly favored the translation of socialists' votes into seats. (Barthelemy 1912 ; Moyne 1970)

Table 1: District Sizes

District Size	1847	1899	Increase since 1847	Left Voting Share*
> 10	0	3	7.3	28.2%
5-9	3	4	3.6	33.2%
4	4	8	0.63	11.2%
3	12	8	0.38	12.1%
2	5	8	0.3	8.8%
1	11	8	0	0.5%

1894 & 1896

Response: The preferences of Swedish Socialists are trick to interpret because they changed over time and, as CIS point out, the reforms of the electoral system were part of larger, constitutional omnibus bills. Such bills make it difficult to precisely infer from Socialists votes' on the overall bill what their specific preferences on electoral systems were. Finally, the available English sources are rather limited thus making it difficult to clarify some of these ambiguities.

My principle sources are Hertlitz *and* Rustow and not just Herlitz as CIS mistakenly report. (Cusack et al. 2010b, 12) CIS are correct that Socialists supported PR *after* its adoption in 1909.¹⁰ However, the relevant historical point of reference is the period *prior* to the adoption of PR. For this period, the evidence is ambiguous. For the period before 1909, Rustow reports that "among Liberals and Socialists was at first little objection to the proportional principle." (Rustow 1955, 62) He then reports that in 1906 Socialists supported a Liberal sponsored reform bill that expanded the male franchise and but called for double ballot electoral system. (Rustow 1955, 66) Eckleberry reports that the double ballot amendment was made by the Socialists. "Branting's suffrage motion of 1905 included a run-off election plan based on the systems then existent in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands." (Eckleberry 1964, 78-9) By 1909, Socialists had again come to support PR but they ended up voting against the 1909 law in large measure because it retained some of the old franchise restrictions. (Verney 1957, 169-71) The evidence thus suggests that the Swedish Socialists vacillated in their support for PR thus making no/yes, yes/no or even yes/no/yes coding palatable given the available information. I think Penades is correct when he

¹⁰ They pages they cited from Verney discuss the 1918 reform bill; this dealt only with the franchise and not the electoral system. (Verney 1957, 212-13)

notes Swedish Socialists, among other Socialists “either opposed PR or, at least, failed to defend.” (Penadés 2008, 215)

It is important to underline, that CIS’ argument offers no reasonable explanation for any of the short term changes of the Socialists’ preferences. Moreover, the fact that Socialists voted against the 1909 bills because did not remove the remaining franchise restrictions suggested that they cared more about vote maximization offered by universal suffrage than the consensual effects of PR.

Page: 12 **Claim:** Swiss Liberals and PR

Response: CIS readily admit that Liberals opposed PR that this contradicts the predictions of their model. They then dismiss the relevance of the Liberals’ opposition to PR with the assertion that “in our interpretation then, Switzerland was not an effective democracy before 1918.” (Cusack et al. 2010b, 13) This conclusion seems to rest on the exclusion of Social Democrats from government by Liberals. Given that Liberals had a parliamentary majority, this hardly seems undemocratic. Moreover, this assertion is stunning given that Switzerland had universal male suffrage since 1848, direct democracy, vibrant free press, guests to exiled radicals from all across Europe, and active user of town hall democracy in many cantons and most municipalities. In short, Switzerland was together with those parts of the US that had not yet succumbed to Jim Crow the most democratic country in the world. The claim that Switzerland was not an effective democracy strikes me as so unencumbered by historical facts that essentially any claim desired by one’s theoretical fantasies becomes empirically tenable.

They then go on to claim that “the Liberal rejection of PR was a mechanism to keep Social Democrats out of power ” and take swipe at Boix by claiming that this “goes exactly against the Rokkan-Boix argument.” First of all, it is unclear why it matters for *their argument* what the specific reasons are for which Liberals opposed PR. Liberals opposed it, they acknowledge this and this should be the end of the story given that Liberals represented those economic sectors that were the most highly skilled. Second, the swipe at Boix misrepresents his argument. Boix clearly claimed that bourgeois parties could use FPTP electoral systems as long as they were not divided thus making the Swiss Liberals support for FPTP perfectly consistent with his model. Finally, CIS end up their bewildering rebuttal of the Swiss case with another ex post qualification of their argument. They state “Our argument is that when electoral rules are no longer primarily used to impede democratization, then parties in proto-corporatist countries will support PR.” I have no idea what they mean here and therefore cannot comment.

Response: Between 1918 and 1935, Austria modified its electoral laws on three occasions, the December 18 1918 law for the constitutional assembly, the July 20, 1920 permanent electoral law, and revised version promulgated on July 11, 1923. All three laws were list PR and differed on relatively small issues like assembly size and seat allocation formula. CIS cited Gerlich and Campbell's account that focuses on the overall constitutional deliberations in 1920 that were indeed based on an all party consensus. They infer from this all party consensus on the overall constitution a consensus on the second 1920 electoral system. Such an inference seem reasonable but short of presenting any direct evidence we won't know.

The only direct evidence that I was able to find relates to the December 18, 1918 electoral law. Maren Seliger and Karl Ucakar report that the German Nationals opposed PR. They write that these opponents "vehemently opposed ... the proposed form of proportional representation with fixed lists. This was because the speakers of the smaller German-National groups, with their individualistic orientation, felt [that PR] would disadvantage them." (Seliger and Ucakar 1984, 57) German Nationals won roughly 16% of the seats for the 1919 Constitutional Assembly. These two authors do not discuss actors' preferences for the 1920 and 1923 electoral laws. I think my coding is correct for the 1918 electoral law. CIS might be correct for the 1920 electoral law what this would require re-specifying their theory to explain changes in time or why actors might have different electoral systems preferences for constitutional assembly than for regular parliamentary elections. Incidentally, Seliger and Ucakar write that the Christian Social Party, the larger of the two bourgeois parties, readily accepted PR "as protection against the feared socialist majority." (Seliger and Ucakar 1984, 57)

On the issue of improper citation, CIS are correct that neither Ziblatt nor Anderson talk about Austria or electoral systems. It cited them because they describe the type individualistic, notable parties that the Austrian German Nationals were and the preference of such notables had for FPTP electoral systems. The source to document the preferences of the German Nationals comes one sentence later leaving me befuddled why CIS were unable to find it.

Response: CIS object to my coding indicating that Labour switched from supporting to opposing PR and that Liberals switched from initially supporting to opposing FPTP. (Kreuzer 2010, 376, 82) The label my assertion that there was lack of cross-party support for majoritarian elections" remarkably misleading. They then try to support their cases through a lengthy

account of the Britain's electoral reform efforts. During this discussion, they assert, all three parties "were nearly always in favor of FPTP, at least since 1884," they mention three exception from this all party support for FPTP (W.W. 1, 1923-24, 1929-31), that Liberals drop "to third party status ... caused them to campaign for PR", that House of Commons passed the alternative vote in 1931. Taken together, the examples offered by CIS provide in my opinion more evidence for a lack of cross-party support than what I offered on page 382. For further evidence on just how divided the British parties were on the issue of PR, see evidence provided by Andrews and Jackman. (2004, 75)

Page: 14 **Claim:** Recoding of Dutch Socialists

Response: CIS claims that Dutch Socialists were not divided over PR but changed their preferences over time. Given the dearth English sources, it is difficult to definitely establish whether they were divided or changed their preferences. From the vantage point of their theoretical argument, they should be neither divided nor change their preferences. So, how we code Dutch Socialists should be irrelevant.

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