Violence is a fact of human history and it must be considered by any political theory that claims to be realistic. Since Eden every age has been tinged with violence. Humans die in wars. Criminals do deadly deeds that seem to cry out for capital punishment. Terrorists use random destruction to promote a cause. Innocents perish at the hands of unjust aggressors. Others are killed in conflict of life situations created by nature itself.

Little can be done to control the apparent barbarism of nature, but sometimes the barbarism of humans can be controlled. The question for the person trying to live morally is "How far may I go in trying to correct nature's violent incursions on human life? How far may I go in opposing the violent attacks of humans against humans?"

The purpose of the pages that follow is to examine the answer given by St. Augustine to such questions. Augustine's interest in such questions was more than theoretical. He lived in violent times. As he sadly observed to a friend: "We exist at peace only because of the promises of barbarians."(1) He was a leader of people and as such felt responsible for protecting them from the brigands and barbarians of the day. At the same time he fought to control the violent tendencies of his own people which led them sometimes to take the law into their own hands in time of crisis. He faced questions about just punishment for heinous crimes, the appropriate use of military force in the face of unjust attack, and the moral response to terroristic threats. And he experienced within his own being the passions which sometimes tempt every human to resort to violence for personal gain or pleasure. Day after day Augustine faced the questions: "How am I to live a rational (noble) life in a world of violence? Must I suffer it passively? May I respond to it by violent means? Indeed, am I morally at fault if I do NOT respond to it?"

In exploring Augustine's answer to these questions I shall examine the following issues:

1. the nature and causes of violence;

2. violence as a permanent condition;

3. Augustine's general ethical principles;

4. application of principle to violence as defined.

In part 2, I will examine how Augustine applied his principles to the practical issues of self-defense, war, capital punishment, and killing the innocent.

The Nature Of Violence

Recent works on terrorism and violence have defined violence in various ways.(2) In this discussion I shall define violent action as any action of one human being against another which either contravenes the rights of others or causes injury to their life, person, property, or freedom.

By this definition I mean to include two sorts of violent actions:

(1) those which contravene the existing rights of another; (2) those which inflict "injury" on another against her/his will.

In this second case "injury" is taken to mean a lessening of any good which contributes to the flourishing of a human life. This would include such goods as life, physical and mental wholeness, freedom, property, etc. Such injury occurs even when it is a means to a very great good. Thus, if a person is kept alive against their will by extraordinary means of preserving life, injury is done to the good of freedom even though the good of life is preserved.

By definition any act against the existing rights of another is a violent act. In the case of inalienable rights this will be true even though the subject of the right seems to make no objection. If my right to be treated as a human being is inalienable, then to treat me in a non-human fashion is always an act of violence. Of course if the right in question is alienable, the subject of the right has some power to give it away. I do not do violence in ignoring a promise I have made to you if you have released me from the promise

It follows from this definition that violent acts against the existing rights of others are always immoral since they are always violations of the principle of justice. Acts which are violent because they inflict "injury" may or may not be immoral. The concept of "doing injury" does not contain the concept of "breaking moral principle x" and therefore this form of violent activity cannot be said to be immoral by definition.

Violence in the sense of "doing injury" may in fact be immoral, but in each instance the morality/immorality must be argued. A particular war may in fact be immoral. It does not follow from the definition of violence that it is necessarily so. The morality or immorality of violence in such instances needs further argument.

The Causes Of Violence

Arguments about the morality of violent actions will be greatly influenced by one's conclusions on the causes of violence. Three sorts of explanation have been offered. The first asserts that violent actions flow from human nature itself. Humans are by nature aggressive animals and the best that can be done is to control their aggression by external means. There is no internal cure. A second theory will maintain that the human is completely determined by environment. In the right environment any human would be pacific. In the wrong environment any one of us becomes beastly. In this view violence can be cured. The problem is to find and create the environment that will eliminate it. A third view will hold that violence is the result of human freedom. If it were possible to convince humans that violence is never a rational course to follow, then human violence would cease to be a factor in human history.(3)

Augustine's explanation of violence comes closest to the third approach though he is not as sanguine about the possibilities as some of its proponents. It is true that the human being is free, but it is a wounded freedom. By and large humans are responsible for their history. They choose to be what they are and to do what they do. However they also are flawed (Augustine calls them "cracked pots") and it is this "crackedness" that leads to the sometimes perversity of their choices. Humans are not corrupt by nature but they have been wounded and this woundedness is the real cause of the extraordinary amount of violence in human history.

Humans are able to choose but in fact there is often a disorder in their choice. It manifests itself in three ways. In its first form disordered choice causes humans to choose the things of this world over God Himself. In fact humans are caught in the middle of this actual world. They are less than God but are better than the rest of material creation. In their spirit they have a natural tendency to ascend to God. In their matter they have a tendency to be attached to the everyday world of material goods. An unwounded humanity would have been able resolve this opposition, but as it is humans often find themselves at odds with themselves.

The second expression of disordered choice has to do with method. We humans have become so self-centered that now we tend to choose even truly good things in selfish ways. Our selfish attitudes endanger even our most noble actions. When we fall in love with another human we must strain to truly make our love dedicated to the loved one and not to ourselves. When we enjoy the good things of this life it is difficult to avoid making them the "end all and be all" of our existence. Sometimes we reach for the things we enjoy with no thought of the needs of others. We are choosing true goods but in a selfish way. Such selfish desire is disordered even when the good desired is the highest possible good. Certainly to wish to possess God while hoping that no one else possesses Him is the choice of a sick and wounded will.

A third manifestation of disordered choice has to do with method also. In the second form of disordered choice discussed above true goods were chosen but in a selfish way. In this third form true goods are sought by improper means. Thus, it is certainly a good to preserve one's life, but this will not justify any and all means. I may not save myself by committing an injustice against another human. I may not save my life by blaspheming God. In Augustine's view the methods of waging war were as relevant to moral decisions about war as were the reasons for declaring it. A noble end will never justify perverse means.

Augustine believed that perverse human choice, in whatever form it takes, is the chief cause of violence in this life. Wounded will and darkened intellect are the culprits, not environment and not human nature. And no one is exempt from this flaw. All humans share a common disability and without the grace of God all would succumb. Perhaps because of his own wild and confused youth, Augustine was absolutely convinced that the tendency towards abject stupidity and uncontrolled passion is seeded in every one of us. Every one of us is born in ignorance and as soon as we become conscious all sorts of crazy desires begin to surface. Left to ourselves, we would try every evil ever recorded in human history and probably invent a few of our own along the way.(4)

Violence As A Permanent Condition

With these assumptions about human woundedness, Augustine could reach no other conclusion than that violence is a permanent part of human experience this side of death. Violence will disappear only when the human race has perfect peace. But peace is the absence of conflict and in the present wounded state of humanity it is impossible to eliminate conflict. This is so because the essential conflict is within each individual. We are torn between the goods of this world and the promises of the next. At one and the same time we desire to be more than we can be while being tempted to be less than we are. We are dusty angels, looking to the heavens as we fight for the goods of this earth. We want everything and are jealous of those who have anything that is not ours. The logic of our conflict is straightforward:

(1) we will not be at peace until we are perfectly happy;

(2) but to be perfectly happy we must have all our natural desires fulfilled;

(3) but we are made in such a way that our desires are infinite;

(4) but in this life we can only possess the finite;

(5) and thus in this life we cannot achieve perfect peace nor perfect happiness.

In Augustine's words:

Each individual in this community is driven by his passions to pursue his private purposes. Unfortunately, the objects of these purposes are such that no one person can ever be wholly satisfied...The result is that the city of man remains in a chronic condition of civil war. Hence there is always the oppression of those who fail by those who succeed.(5)

The result is a world in which violence is always possible, a world in which it cannot be eliminated but only controlled. What Augustine once wrote of a people is no less true of every individual:

Human vicissitudes being what they are no nation was ever so secure as to be free from all fear of hostile attacks on its life.(6)

The danger of violence will always be part of the human experience. The practical problem thus becomes the determination of methods of control which are both realistic and consistent with moral principles.

Augustine's Fundamental Moral Principles

Before addressing Augustine's moral judgment on violence, we must say something about his general principles of ethics. Perhaps the fundamental question for any ethicist is "What makes any morally good action to be morally good?" A suggestion of Augustine's answer can be found in the "City Of God" (7) where he defines ethics as the science which deals with that supreme good towards which all human actions are directed. This definition implies two facts at the foundation of his ethical system:

1. Actions which are properly described as human actions have an innate tendency towards a specific goal;

2. This goal is the supreme good for human beings and once it is achieved no further good is sought. By possessing this good the individual human achieves perfect happiness.

Augustine had already come to accept a third fact about the human species, namely:

3. Every human being wishes to be happy.

Since this desire is universal, it must be rooted in human nature itself. To be a human being is to desire happiness. This is the way human beings are. Since Augustine believed that every individual's existence rested ultimately on the creative act of a beneficent Creator, a fourth fact was clear to him:

4. The desire for happiness in each human being is caused by the Creator.

Augustine was convinced that humanity has a common subjective goal: happiness. This is the subjective state towards which every human being is drawn. But is it possible to bring about this happy state? Is there something which when possessed will bring perfect happiness? If such a reality exists, it is the objective goal of human beings and (along with the perfect happiness it causes) constitutes the proper object of the science of ethics. Ethics then becomes a reasonable endeavor, searching out what this supreme good for humans might be, examining the possibility of its achievement, and giving principles outlining a method of pursuing it. This rational structure collapses if any of the three tasks is impossible, and the last two rest on successful completion of the first: establishing the existence and nature of the supreme good for human beings.

What then can be said about this supreme good? Augustine begins to identify some of its characteristics by examining what is necessary to make a human being perfectly happy. Looking into himself he perceives some clear rules:

1. I cannot be happy if I lack what I love.

2. I cannot be happy if I love something that is harmful.

3. I cannot be happy if I possess the best but do not love it.

4. I cannot be happy if I love and possess the best, but

(a) will lose it in the future or,

(b) have the possibility of losing it, or

(c) am afraid of losing it.(8)

From this analysis Augustine derives a fifth fact useful for the development of his ethics:

(5) Perfect human happiness will be achieved if and only if the individual loves and possesses that which is best for them and possesses this good without fear of loss.

The phrase "best for human beings" needs explanation. It is clear from Augustine's analysis of happiness that a good is not made "best" for me simply because I desire it. I can desire things which are really not good for me at all. Moreover I can be in possession of good truly fitted to me but not realize it and therefore not desire it. Desire is thus separable from true good and therefore cannot constitute it. Augustine's conviction was that good was rooted in being, not desire. Things are not good because I desire them. I desire things because (rightfully or wrongfully) I perceive them to be good for me. Whether or not they really are good for me will depend on what they are and what I am. What is "best" for me will depend on the nature of things. There is a hierarchy in being and I possess a very definite place in that hierarchy. By reason of my spiritual soul I am below God, equal to the angels, and better than the rest of the universe.(9) As a human being I am literally in the middle of things. Some reality is above me and some is below me and since reality insofar as it is real is good, there are higher goods and lower goods. Since happiness is fulfilled desire and since desire is created by apprehension of good, Augustine concludes that happiness can come only from possession of the highest possible good. He asks:

If we find something that is both more perfect than the human being and which can be achieved by loving it, who would doubt that the human being should, in order to be happy, strive to possess this thing which is more excellent than the human who seeks it.(10)

Augustine had no doubts about the existence of a being more excellent than the human beings who sought it. After years of searching he came to see that there was a supreme being who was ... the chief good, the good of all goods, the good whence all goods come, the good without which nothing is good, and the good which is good for other things."(11)

The existence of such supreme good established the first condition for perfect human happiness. At least a being existed which, if possessed, could satisfy the infinite thirst of human beings. Augustine now had a sixth fact for the foundation of his ethical principles:

(6) God is the supreme good which when possessed will bring perfect happiness.

The moral good for humans, the goal of human life, is nothing less than the possession of God. Augustine's faith convinced him that such possession was indeed possible. The only question remaining was the question of method. It seems logical to suppose that God is to be possessed by action rather than non-action, but action of what sort? One may reasonably say that any action is good which leads to possession of the supreme good, but what is the characteristic of any specific act that warrants the claim that in fact it does bring one closer to the goal? The original question recurs: "What concretely makes an action morally good rather than morally evil?"

Augustine's answer can be stated in the form of a seventh assertion about reality, an assertion which explicitly ties the moral to the ontological:

(7) The morally good act will be that one which is in accord with the order of the universe.

Augustine expresses this principle as follows:

Everything that God created is good...Thus the rational soul performs good actions when it observes the order of creation...when it chooses the greater over the lesser, the higher over the lower, the spirit over the body, the eternal over the temporal.(12)

The instrument of the moral act is human choice. It is by choosing well that an individual is moved closer to the supreme good and perfect happiness. The crucial virtue for the moral life will thus be Charity,

A movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for his own sake and one's self and one's neighbor for the sake of God.(13)

We are drawn towards that which we love. To be drawn towards our true goal our love here and now must be an ordered love...a love which respects the order of the universe and fights to maintain it.

The most important virtue for the human being is indeed charity (loving well) but the first law of morality seems more akin to to each their due. The mandate of the eternal law is that the order of the universe be preserved and not disturbed.(14) There is no contradiction here. Love worthy of the name must be an ordered love. Love which perfects the lover and respects the object of love is a love which recognizes the love-object's place in the universe and treats it accordingly. By true love we subject the lower to the higher and preserve equality among equals. The perfection of love leads to the perfection of order. Thus the command of the eternal law that "all things should be more perfectly ordered"(15) does not conflict with Augustine's moral guideline "Love! And do whatever you wish!"(16) One who does not work to perfect order in the universe cannot claim to truly love. "Love demands the preservation and perfection of order." This is the underlying assumption of a characteristically Augustinian ethical judgment on every course of action, including those which involve violence.

Augustine identifies three possible sources of disorder (and therefore immorality) in a particular human act. These are

(1) the act itself,

(2) the authorization for the action.

(2) the person doing the action,(17)

An action may be immoral because it is in conflict with the order of the universe by its very nature. Thus blasphemy contradicts the factual subordination of the creature to the Creator. It is impossible for the Creator to be subordinate to the creature, but blasphemy (the cursing of God) by its very nature asserts such subordination. It must therefore always and everywhere be forbidden. Even God could not make it to be moral. So too adultery is always immoral because its practice denies the existence of the contract that its definition assumes. No authorization divine or human, no noble intention, no set of circumstances can make blasphemy or adultery or other "naturally disordered acts" to be morally good. Perhaps they can be understood and even forgiven, but they can never be justified. By their very nature they disrupt the order of the universe and thereby are acts of disordered love.

A second source of disorder in a human act is the lack of proper authority. Thus taking the goods of another becomes stealing only when it is against the reasonable will of the owner. A morally indifferent medical procedure can become immoral if done without the consent of a competent patient. Unlike those acts which are disordered by nature, these can be remedied. If proper authorization is present, the taking of the goods of another ceases to be evil. If appropriate patient consent is present, a medical procedure can become an expression of professional virtue.

The third cause of disorder in the human act is in the intention of the agent. A bad intention can vitiate even the most noble action. There is no merit in "doing" good if we are choosing badly...if we are loving in a disordered way. Augustine makes this point clearly in his debate with Faustus:

Injustice (i.e. immoral action) is found in every case where a man loves for their own sake things which should be desired only as means to an end, and seeks for the sake of something else things which ought to be loved for themselves. By so acting he disturbs as far as he can the natural order which the eternal law requires us to observe.(18)

Therefore it is not enough to look at the external action to judge the morality of an action. Diverse intentions can make an action otherwise good to be evil. A father may beat a child for its own good. A pederast may give the same child candy to win its trust. To judge from externals the father is vicious and the pederast is virtuous. But in fact the moral reality is quite different. One and the same action can be preserved as morally good or made morally evil by the intention of the agent. In Augustine's words: "Though the action be the same, yet if we take into account the diverse intentions we discover that in one case the agent is to be praised while in another case the agent is to be condemned."(19)

Augustine is not saying that intention alone determines the morality of an action. Good intentions cannot make a "naturally disordered" act to be ordered. Nor can they substitute for a lack of authority to perform the act. Good intention does have the gratifying ability to make even insignificant morally indifferent acts of import for eternity, but bad intention has the terrifying power of vitiating actions which would otherwise be eminently virtuous. Such is the power of disordered love. True love will not permit the performance of ignoble acts and there is no heroism that can make up for its absence. This is the force of Augustine's cry:

Love, and do what you will!...for if the root of your action is true love, then it is impossible that anything but good can come from it. (20)

The Morality Of Violent Acts

When Augustine's general moral principles are applied to violent actions as defined here, it is evident that those actions which involve an unjust attack are always disordered and therefore immoral. They are disordered precisely because the actions are contrary to the reality of the situation. Reality proclaims that rights exist; the unjust action pretends that they do not. In choosing injustice the agent is guilty of disordered love, effectively desiring a reordering of fact whereby the victim of the injustice becomes subordinate to the perpetrator.

The moral status of violence which simply inflicts "injury" on another is more problematical. The word "injury" covers a multitude of hurts. Any lessening of a good contributing to human flourishing falls under the concept. A diminishing of life or health or freedom is always injurious to the one who suffers the diminishing. It seems unreasonable to assert that such "injuring" is either always moral or always immoral. Intuitively it is more sensible to agree that some cases of injuring are moral and that other cases are not... that is, some violent acts are justified and others are not. Having granted this, one can begin the search for the norm which will distinguish the moral uses of violence from the immoral.

For Augustine the norm is his general norm of morality: An act is morally good if it is an act of ordered love, i.e. a choice which fosters the order of reality. A violent act will be morally forbidden if it is disorderly in any one of the three ways specified by Augustine. Though no violent act (in the sense of doing injury) will be disordered in and of itself, it is possible that a particular instance of injuring will be disordered either because the agent has no authority to inflict the injury or because the intention is bad. Spanking a child causes pain but it is not for that reason that it becomes immoral. It becomes immoral if the one who disciplines has no authority to do so or does it with an improper attitude or in an immoderate way. Though Augustine lamented mightily about the beatings he received during his early school years, he did not question the authority of his teachers to discipline their students. He complained only about their hypocrisy in punishing the young for the very same games that they the teachers played in their adult world. The disorder in their acts came not from a lack of right but from a lack of right attitude. The imposition of unwanted discipline was not disorderly. It was the intention. Indeed, Augustine came to realize that a bit of discipline is good for most poor human souls, though most of us are unwilling to accept it when it comes to us. Those charged with the care of others must be ready to punish as well as reward. It could even be a virtuous act for a father to give a beating to his son if it is truly necessary for the son's own good.(21)

This last example suggests that in some cases a violent act may be morally required. This would occur when, all things considered, the violence fosters order rather than disorder. This somewhat strange possibility could be realized if certain assumptions are granted:

1. Violence (in the sense of doing injury) is not in and of itself disorderly. Violence to be moral needs justification but such justification is possible.

2. The order of the universe is served by the lessening of violence and therefore responsible agents cannot be indifferent to its existence. Ordered love must act when it can lessen the injury coming from violent acts whether these flow from blind forces of nature or perverse choices of humans.

3. In some cases the use of violence can lessen the quantity of violence in the universe. For example, mandatory vaccination against small pox ("injurious" in the sense of being an invasion of bodily integrity and a lessening of individual freedom) may prevent a much greater quantity of "injury" coming from a deadly plague.

4. In some cases the use of violence can lessen disorder in the universe by preventing violence which is both injurious and unjust. Thus a king charged with protection of the common good may actually lessen the disorder in the universe by killing an aggressor who threatens to kill an innocent civilian. Though in any case a human life will be lost, it seems intuitively to be less disordered to have an unjust aggressor die than an innocent victim.

To sum up, a typical Augustinian analysis will admit that violence is morally permitted if it is an act of ordered love, that is, a choice which does not disturb the order of the universe. Moreover, one may be morally obliged to perform a violent act if it is clear that such an act is necessary or useful for the preservation or promotion of the order of the universe. These two assertions rest on the assumptions that

(1) every human being is morally bound to seek the ultimate end, and

(2) this is done by acts of ordered love, choices that respect and promote the order of the universe, and

(3) such ordered love is absent when agents either act against the order of the universe or do not attempt to foster it in situations where they have the ability and the responsibility to do so.

In a word, violence in a world of violence may be the only way of lessening the disorder coming from violence. It is not a perfect solution to be sure, but in an imperfect world it may just be the only way to work for that order and peace which God intended and wants for the human race. As we shall see in Part 2, it is this sentiment that drove Augustine in his discussion of the particular problems of just war, just punishment, individual self-defense, and killing the innocent.



1. Letter 47, 2. Cf. P.R.L. Brown, "Political Society," in R.A. Markus, Augustine (Doubleday & Co.: 1972), p. 324.

2. Cf. Kai Nielsen, "Violence and Terrorism: Its Uses and Abuse," in Burton M. Leiser (ed), Values In Conflict: Life, Liberty and the Rule of Law, (Macmillan: 1986), p.436.

3. Examples of each view can be found throughout ancient and modern philosophy. Hobbes and Nietzsche hold that the human animal is fundamentally anti-social and must be corralled and controlled by strong laws and strong leaders. Schopenhauer writes: "Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, if only in the business of taming and restraining him which we call civilization."The Pessimist's Handbook, Hazel E. Barnes ed., Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1964, pp. 338-39). The influence of environment has been stressed by Behaviorism and such individual philosophers as Marx and Rousseau. Perhaps the purest example of the view that freedom is the cause of violence can be found in those who will maintain that in fact "virtue is knowledge" and that through education all of human perversity can be eliminated. An example of how these approaches are reflected in current debate about social issues can be found in an interesting article by Andrew Hacker, "On Original Sin And Conservatives," in The New York Times Magazine, February 25, 1973, pp 13 ff. A comparison of the views of Augustine and Hobbes is given by Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (Columbia Univ. Press: 1963), p. 50 & pp. 234-5.

4. City of God, bk. 22, c. 22. For an extended and well-documented presentation of Augustine's views on the human condition cf. Deane, op. cit., pp. 39-77. Cf. also G.R. Evans, Augustine On Evil (Cambridge University Press: 1982), pp. 29 ff.

5. City of God, bk.18, c.2. G. Walsh & D. Honan trs. (Fathers of the Church, Inc.: New York, 1954), vol 24, p. 84. Cf. Deane, op. cit., pp. 46-7. Brown comments: "The central problem of Augustine's (political) thought is one which we all have to face: to what extent is it possible to treat man as having a measure of rational control over his political environment?" op. cit., p.313.

6. City of God. bk. 17, c. 13, p. 60. James O'Donnell is on the mark when he writes: "In earthly terms, the vision of human society the City of God provides is unremittingly bleak, even if indisputable. Most human societies, enamored with the daydreams of politics, pretend the human condition is better than it is. Men forget history because they do not want to remember that others have gone down paths of prosperity and complacency before them." Augustine (Boston: Twayne Pub., 1985), p. 59.

7. City of God, Bk. 8, c. 8. For a full discussion of Augustine's ethical theory cf. Bernard Roland-Gosselin, La Morale de Saint Augustin (Paris: Marcel Riviere: 1925). On page 44 he makes a strong case that Augustine's ethics is founded on divine being more than on divine will. Other authors (mistakenly, I believe) have argued that Augustine's position is an example of divine voluntarism. Cf. Vernon Bourke, "Voluntarism In Augustine's Ethico-legal Thought," Augustinian Studies, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 3 ff. And Cf. Joseph Koterski, "St. Augustine On The Moral Law," Augustinian Studies, vol. 11 (1980) pp 65 ff.

8. Cf. On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichaeans, bk. l, c. 3, # 4; The Trinity, bk. 13, c. 8.

9. Cf. The Quantity of the Soul, c. 34, #78.

10. On the Morals of the Catholic Church ..., bk. l, c. 3, # 5.

11. Commentary on Psalm 134, # 6.

12. Letter 140, c. 2, # 4; cf. Free Will, bk. I, c.8, # 18; bk. I, c. 15, # 32. It is clear that Augustine's call for a preservation of order is not a call for the preservation of the various contingent "orders" that humans create in their social and political structures...orders where, for example, the strong dominate the weak. The eternal law calls for the preservation of the order of the universe, an order which is created by God at the very root of being. Order for Augustine is the disposition of equals and unequals in accordance with their appropriate place in the scheme of things (City of God, bk 19, c.13). Order is not present when that which is superior is made subservient to the inferior (Free Will, I, 8, 18). On these points cf. Roland-Gosselin, op. cit, pp. 26-7. Cf. also Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (Random House Pub.: New York, 1960), pp. 130-31.

13. Christian Doctrine, bk. 3, c. 10, # 16.

14. Against Faustus the Manichean, bk. 22, c. 27.

15. Free Will, bk. 1, c. 6.

16. Commentary on the Letter of John, tr. 7, c. 4, # 7.

17. Against Faustus the Manichean, bk. 22, # 73.

18. Ibid., # 78.

19. Commentary on the Letter of John, tr. 7, c. 4, # 7.

20. Ibid.

21. Confessions, bk. 1, c. 9, # 14-15; Commentary on the Letter of John, tr. 7, c.4, #7.